Aggregate action is often essential to secure relief for consumers and to hold businesses accountable for wrongdoing. Businesses have adopted class-action bans to prevent consumers from bringing legitimate claims.
Plaintiff's UCL Cause of Action does not conflict with or otherwise undermine national banks' federally authorized lending power. Public policy considerations weigh in favor of a conclusion that the students' UCL claim is not prempted.
The Panel’s decision is contrary to the plain language of the FCRA and nullifies its requirement to filter out unverifiable information, the panel’s decision establishes a de facto technical accuracy standard, contrary to existing circuit precedent; and the Panel’s decision ignores the grave responsibilities that Congress Imposed on CRAs.
The issues presented in this case implicate the interests of millions of American consumers whose sensitive personal information is regularly shared, often without their knowledge, among financial firms, insurance companies, landlords, employers and others. The question presented here is whether the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) (“FCRA”) preempts the CMIA in instances in which a health care provider improperly discloses confidential medical information to a third party, where that third party happens to be a consumer reporting agency as defined by the FCRA.
Liberty Tax Service violated the UCL and the FDCPA by misleading consumers into signing agreements with hidden provisions purporting to allow the cross-collection of debts.
Payday lenders, one of the main players in the “fringe banking” industry, target vulnerable borrowers who cannot access traditional sources of credit and, rather than helping them handle a short-term crisis, actually exacerbate their financial distress. The relationships that Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans claim to have with various tribal entities should be scrutinized to ensure it is not merely the most recent version of decades-old ruses to avoid regulation by State laws. Each organization and its extensive involvement in advocacy to pierce these ruses and to protect borrowers from fringe lenders is described in detail in the Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners with which this brief is conditionally filed.
Pursuant to Rule 5:30 of the Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court and with the approval of this Court, the National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) and the Virginia Poverty Law Center (VPLC) as amici curiae support the Petition for Appeal by Wilma L. Ruby (Ms. Ruby). Amici requests that the Supreme Court of Virginia grant Ms. Ruby an appeal of the final Order of the Circuit Court of the County of Shenandoah dated December 22, 2009, regarding her claims against Cashnet, Inc., (Cashnet).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held below that, under the FAA, a court must decide a threshold dispute over whether an arbitration clause is enforceable or is unconscionable under applicable state contract law despite the clause’s provision for an arbitrator to decide its validity. In urging reversal, Rent-A-Center and its amici ask the Court to hold that the FAA allows the drafter of a mandatory arbitration clause to make the clause self-enforcing simply by writing in that an arbitrator, not a court, shall decide disputes over validity. This argument is contrary to the letter and purposes of the FAA. The Act provides that written agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
NACA and NCLC have filed this brief out of concern that two recent Missouri appellate cases directly conflict with this Court's decision of October 6, 2009. The two Missouri cases are Woods v. QC Financial Services, Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90 (Mo. App. 2008) and Huch v. Charter Conmmunications, Inc., 290 S. W.2d 721 (Mo. banc 2009).
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a debt collector may avoid liability by showing beyond a preponderance of the evidence that its violation of the Act “was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 5 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Does this defense extend to a debt collector’s
ignorance of the law?